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JURISDICTION-LIBEL-First Amendment's Role in
Determining Place of Trial in Libel Actions
State and federal courts have often displayed a reluctance to
entertain libel suits against newspapers when jurisdiction over the
defendant is based solely upon the distribution of a small number
of newspapers within the forum state.1 Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for this hesitation is the mischief that can be worked by a simultaneous, literal application of the rules of libel and the rules of
jurisdiction, A common view of libel places the tort at the point of
"publication," that is, at the point of communication to third parties.2
Moreover, most states have now enacted statutes which provide that
the commission of a single tort within the state is sufficient to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the state over the tortfeasor. 3 When

1. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley
v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964); Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536
(5th Cir. 1964); Walker v. Field Enterprises, 332 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1964); Perna v.
Dell Publishing Co., 240 F. Supp. 268 (D. Mass. 1964); Breckenridge v. Time, Inc.,
253 Miss. 835, 179 S.2d 781 (1965). On the other hand, there are cases in which
jurisdiction was exercised despite the defendant's protests that circulation of his
publication within the forum state was too small. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366
F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966) ("wide circulation"-no figures): Origoni v, Bulletin Co.,
258 F, Supp. 359 (D.D.C, 1966),
2. This rule originated in Duke v. Harmer, 117 Eng, Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849), found in
RJ!:sTATEMENT OF nm LMV OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377, n.5, at 357 (1934).
3. E,g., !LL. Rzy, STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1965); .ret: Elkhart Epg'r Corp. v. Dornier
Werke, 3¾3 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965) •.
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the two rules are combined, they interact to make the publisher who
mails a single copy of his newspaper into a state the potential defendant of a libel suit in that state, regardless of the distance between
the forum and the publisher's business and editorial offices or his
place of publishing.a!
The seeming unfairness of basing jurisdiction solely on such ordinarily inconsequential acts as mailing a newspaper into another
state has troubled some courts.5 Traditionally, the validity of such
a jurisdictional basis would be judged against the fourteenth amendment standard of "fair play." 6 In several recent cases, however, courts
have brought to bear constitutional standards of free speech as well as
of fairness in dealing with the problem of jurisdiction over the outof-state defendant in a libel action. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in deciding New York Times Go. v. Connor, ruled that
"First Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause
than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious
activity." 7 Shortly after this pronouncement the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in New York Post v. Buckley,8 rejected the
Connor position and proposed instead that first amendment considerations be handled through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a third case, Curtis Publishing Go. v. Golino,9 the Fifth Circuit,
which had decided Cottnor, declared that jurisdiction might be
acquired more easily where the defendant is a national magazine
rather than a newspaper.10 This Note attempts an analysis of the
rules formulated in these cases and the criticism and commentary,
both judicial and academic, which have been directed at them.
I. THE

CASES

Connor involved a newspaper article on racial tensions in Birmingham, Alabama, which criticized the plaintiff as well as the general community. Jurisdiction was based upon the publication of the
alleged libel within the state: approximately 395 copies of the New
York Times were mailed daily (2,455 on the weekend) into Alabama
at that time. The rule formulated by the Connor court, requiring
4. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966), is illustrative
of the problem involved although in this instance the court found that it was without
jurisdiction.
5. E.g., .Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470, 475 {5th Cir. 1964) ("Such is
not enough to make it reasonable and just ... for the State of Louisiana to enforce
against them the obligations arising out of such activities").
6. lntcmational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1964).
8. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
9. 38!1 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
10. The Conner and Golino opinions were both written by Judge Thornberry. The
other two members of the court were not the same on these two occasions.
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a "greater showing of contact," was designed to protect publishers
with minimal circulation in a state from the disproportionate risks
of bias-inflated jury verdicts. 11 The court felt that such protection
was necessary not so much for the publisher's sake as for the preservation of vital interests of the people of the state, since the publisher
would be likely to cease distribution of his publication in any state
"where the size of circulation does not balance the danger of this
liability. " 12
Buckley involved neither small circulation nor inflammatory
racial issues. Mail circulation of the New York Post in Connecticut,
where suit was brought, was placed at an average of I, 707 copies daily.
The precise number of copies "tucked each day under the arms of
commuters" was unknown, but the court indicated its belief that the
number was quite substantial.13 The distances between the defendant
and the forum were also very different in Connor and Buckley: in
the former the New York Times was summoned from New York to
Alabama; in the latter the New York Post 1vas summoned from New
York to Fairfield County, Connecticut, only forty miles from New
York City.14 The Buckley court considered the Connor precedent
and rejected it, both in application to the facts of the Buckley case
and in principle. In place of the Connor rule a modified doctrine
was suggested: "the First Amendment could be regarded as giving
forum non conveniens special dimensions and constitutional stature
• • • • " 15 Even as modified, however, the doctrine was of no avail
to the New York Post. Lack of substantial inconvenience and of
regional or racial prejudice ruled out any application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.
The Golino case involved a magazine rather than a newspaper.
The article containing the alleged libel discussed organized crime.
Circulation of the defendant's publication, the Saturday Evening
Post, consisted of 5,000 to 6,000 newsstand sales and 54,000 to 55,000
subscription copies each week. Judge Thornberry, author of both the
Golino and Connor decisions, distinguished Connor on the basis of
circulation and the nature of the publication. With respect to the
latter the court said:
The existence of a newspaper, no matter how popular, depends
primarily upon circulation in the vicinity of its publication. Circulation in other areas may well be welcomed, but it is not critical to
11. 365 F.2d at 572.

12. Id. For a recent discussion of the general problems of long-arm jurisdiction
over out-of-state publishers, see Note, Can the "Long-Arm" Reach Out-of-State
Publishers?, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 83 (1967).
13. 373 F.2d at 184.
14. Suit was brought in the state court, but the case was removed to the federal
court.
15. 373 F.2d at 183-84.
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the newspaper's continued existence.... Such is not the case with
a publisher of a national magazine. The primary function of such a
business is to sell as many magazines as possible in every state of the
union, and to that end the corporation actively directs its business.16

II. CRITICISMS OF CONNOR
The Buckley court was not the only source of criticism of Connor.
Law review commentary has been almost uniformly unfavorable to
the incorporation of first amendment principles in questions of
jurisdiction.17 Four main arguments have been advanced: (I) permitting first amendment policy to affect rules of jurisdiction is a misapplication of the concept of due process; (2) special protection for
out-of-state publishers is unfair to defamed plaintiffs; (3) special
protection for out-of-state publishers is unnecessary; and (4) even if
special protection is necessary, it is supplied adequately by the rule
of New York Times v. Sullivan. 18
A. The First Amendment, Rules of Jurisdiction, and Due Process
The Buckley court expressed its belief that while publishers
should be accorded various protections by procedural rules,
such considerations go not to "jurisdiction" over the defendant ...
but to the consistency with the First Amendment's objectives in a
certain case. The basis for dismissal [of the libel suit], in other words,
would not be the minimum contacts requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause as such. . . . [T]he office served by
the Fourteenth Amendment would be simply the making of the First
applicable to the states.... Putting the matter in a slightly different
way, the First Amendment could be regarded as giving forum non
conveniens special dimensions and constitutional stature in actions
for defamation against publishers and broadcasters.1 9

Buckley thus acknowledged that the first amendment is effective
against the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, 20 and that
16. 383 F.2d at 590
17. Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper
Libel Cases, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 436 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over
Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 Coum. L. REv. 342 (1967); Note, Exercise
of Jurisdiction Over a Newspaper Vacated on the Basis of the Fifth Amendment, 35
FORDHAM L. REv. 726 (1967); Comment, Due Process and First Amendment Considerations in Libel Cases, 52 IowA L. REv. 1034 (1967); Recent Case, Foreign Publishing
Corporation Subject to Suit in Connecticut for Libel; in Personam Jurisdiction Over
News Media Held Governed by First Amendment Considerations of Parties' and
Public's Interests and Not by That Amendment's Application to "Minimum Contacts"
Requirement of Due Process Clause, 4 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 347 (1967); Recent Case, First
Amendment Requires a Greater Showing of Contact in a Libel Action To Satisfy Due
Process Than Is Necessary in other Types of Actions, 20 VAND. L. REv. 921 (1967).
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. 373 F.2d at 183.
20. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ("The fundamental concept of
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed
by the First Amendment.").
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thus applied the first amendment has a proper role in determining
the place of trial. Only the characterization of this role as "jurisdictional" is rejected. In other words, the first amendment does not
prevent the existence of jurisdiction in a given state, but it may prevent the exercise of that jurisdiction. Such a metaphysical distinction
has the advantage of preserving the exclusive status of "fairness" as
the standard for jurisdiction, but it poses a difficult question: what
exactly is "jurisdiction" that cannot be constitutionally exercised?
If the result reached in the Connor case is a desirable one, it
would seem more candid to accept the theory behind it as an exception to the strict test of "fairness" which is generally applied than
to force the theory into a less innovative guise.

B. Fairness to the Plaintiff
The Connor rule has been assailed as being unfair to the libel
plaintiff in at least two ways. First, it is said, Connor denies the libel
plaintiff his traditional right to have his injury measured by a jury
familiar with the standards of the community in which the loss was
suffered (usually, of course, the plaintiff's domicile if it was one of
the places of publication).21 This "right," however, is far from traditional. Before 1961 Alabama had no long-arm statute whereby its
courts might have asserted jurisdiction over the New York Times. 22
Jnqeed, before 1955 no state had a statute that would have permitted
jurisdiction on the basis of newspapers mailed into a state.23 But
apart from the recent origins of any broad right to a trial before
jurors from the plaintiff's community, there are other reasons to
doubt the wisdom of allowing local evaluation of the plaintiff's injuries. While a local jury may be in the best position to gauge such
imponderable injuries as the plaintiff's loss of standing in the community, the same jury is most likely to fall prey to local prejudices.
The $500,000 verdicts awarded in Walker v. Savell 24 and New
York Times v. Sullivan,25 verdicts which survived all the way to the
Supreme Court, should serve as warnings that local understanding is
sometimes inseparable from local prejudice.
21, Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publi$hers: To Chill a Mocking Word,
67 CoLuM, L. REv. 342, 363 (1967).
22. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199(1) (1960). This statute was interpreted not to permit
jurisdiction over the New York Times in New York Times Co. v. Connor, 291 F.2d
492 (5th Cir. 1961), but the decision in New York Times Co. v, Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656,
144 S.2d 25 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), specifically disapproved
the federal court's ruling. On a second appeal, Connor v. New York Times Co., 310
F~d 133 (5th Ch'. 1962), the earlier order of the federal court was vacated and the
case was remanded for trial. The case under discussion in this Note is the appeal taken
from that trial.
23. The first of the general long-arm statutes was that of Illinois. Civil Practice
Act, art. III, § 6, [1955] Ill. Laws 69th Gen. Assembly 2245-46,
24, 393 S.W.2d 671 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1965).
25. 273 Ala. 656, 144 S.2d 25 (1962).
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The second way in which the Connot rule has been said to be
unfair to the libel plaintiff is its effect of forcing him to assume the
expenses and inconveniences of litigation far from home. 26 This argument must be considered, however, in various settings. Clearly, the
well-to-do plaintiff with a meritorious claim should not be seriously
discouraged by the costs of litigating in the defendant's forum. The
unfairness that he experiences is no greater than the unfairness that
the defendant would suffer from litigation in an inconvenient forum.
The well-to-do plaintiff with a worthless or marginal claim, on the
other hand, will be discouraged because his expected recovery will
not justify the expenses of a distant trial. Such a result, however,
cannot be called unfair. Worthless or marginal claims should not be
encouraged at the expense of the free circulation of opinion and
information. The more difficult case is that of the impecunious plaintiff with a meritorious, but modest claim. He indeed may be treated
unfairly by a rule which makes an otherwise worthwhile claim impractical to pursue. There is some comfort in the fact that such
plaintiffs are less likely to be in the news, and hence less likely to
be libeled in the national press. But when such plaintiffs appear,
courts faced with the Connor precedent will have to make the hard
choice between creating an exception to the rule27 and having uniformity with an occasional unfair result. 28
Moreover, strong policy reasons seem to outweigh many questions
of unfairness, as New York Times v. Sullivan demonstrates. There
the Supreme Court decided that the first amendment dictated a complete denial of remedy to the public official who cannot prove malice
in a libel action. 20 Thus the Connor rule, the general effect of which
26. Comment, supra note 21, at 362.
27. More lenient treatment for the impecunious plaintiff need not be deemed an
"exception" to the rule if it is recalled that the Connor rule was presented as a
"balancing" test. The Connor court merely required a greater showing of contact in
cases involving freedom of the press; it did not establish first amendment considerations as the only relevant determinants of jurisdiction. Thus it might be argued that
the economic position of the impecunious plaintiff is simply another factor to be
considered. The opinion in Fourth N.W. Nat'! Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264
Minn. 110, 114-16, 117 N.W.2d 732, 734-36 (1961), appears to have had this principle
in mind in distinguishing between individual and corporate defendants. The economic
means of the parties also seems to underlie the "multistate activity" approach to the
jurisdictional decision suggested by von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1167-73 (1966). The cost of
including the economic means factor, however, is the further complication introduces into pretrial procedure. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
28. Discussion of the fine points of fairness tends to obscure a fact apparently
ignored by some of the Connor critics, viz., present jurisdictional law is not concerned
with a fine balance of fairness. For example, one finds little discussion of mere
inconvenience to the defendant who must defend himself far from home or chief place
of business. For him the jurisdictional question is not whether suit in the plaintiff's
forum is merely unfair, but whether it is "so unfair to the defendant as to amount to
a denial of due process." Cun-ie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 557 (1963).
29. 376 U.S. at 283 (1964).
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is merely to increase the plaintiff's burden in pursuing his remedy,
is far more fair than the remedy-denying rule that the Sullivan decision found to be required by the first amendment.

C. The Need for Special Protection for Publishers in
Interstate Defamation Cases
In the Buckley opinion, Judge Friendly observed:
Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting companies are businesses
conducted for profit and often make very large ones ... [T]hey must
pay the freight; and injured persons should not be relegated to
forums so distant as to make collection of their claims difficult or
impossible unless strong policy considerations demand.30

Thus the profit motive of the publishing business is made to appear
a reason for avoiding special jurisdictional rules for publishers. Yet
it is precisely this profit motive that gave rise to the Connor rule.
Any profits derived from a state with which the publisher has only
minimum contacts may be outweighed by the extra costs of litigating
in that state or by excessive verdicts handed down by biased juries
in that state.31 A publisher faced with increased litigational costs,32
or with the possibility that some excessive verdicts will survive appeal,33 must make a rational economic response. As the Connor court
put it: "In the face of this very real risk, could a publisher justify
distribution of his product in any state where the size of his circulation does not balance the danger of his liability?"34
True, the publisher contemplating termination of distribution
in high-risk states has an alternative. Rather than abandon whatever
income he may derive from these states, he may find it more attractive to exclude, or at least modify, potentially libelous articles. While
libel laws are designed in part to deter the publication of true libels,
such deterrence should not be geared to the standards of the most
sensitive plaintiff or the most inflammable jury. Yet the added cost
30. 373 F.2d at 182.
31. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
32. Increased litigation costs may not be a substantial tbreat to the publisher
already defending a $500,000 law suit, but tbey will always assure the merely vexatious libel plaintiff tbat he can harass tbe large out-of-state newspaper for tbe small
cost of filing within his own state. Under the Connor rule the defendant will still
have to bear the costs involved with raising the Connor defense itself, but he will be
able to avoid tbe otherwise inevitable costs of importing witnesses from his place of
publication in order to settle, for example, the factual question of malicious intent
raised by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
33. If a jury is instructed properly as to the rule in New York Times v. Sullivan con•
cerning actual malice, prejudice can still influence it to make a finding of malice.
When tbe evidence is sufficient to support (but not compel) a finding of malice, tbe
judge and courts of appeal will not be able to discover the true basis for the jury's
decision merely by inspecting the evidence.
34. 365 F.2d at 572.
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of defending even a worthless libel claim in a foreign forum may
have the in terrorem effect of causing the publisher to avoid controversial or highly sensitive articles.35 In such a situation, the impact
on free speech is direct. Furthermore, the publisher's entire readership is affected, not merely the handful that would be affected by
the termination of subscriptions in high-risk states.
The total effect of a publisher's cutting off distribution in a given
state or modifying what he would otherwise have printed is by nature incapable of precise measurement or evaluation. The faith which
the Connor court placed in the importance of the press, however, is
in accord with general legal principles,36 and in particular with the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of widespread public
debate in cases like New York Times v. Sullivan.31

D. The Sufficiency of the Sullivan Rule
The doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan, requiring a public
official to demonstrate actual malice before recovering in an action
for libel, has been advanced as a protection for the press sufficient
to accomplish the goals of the Connor court.38 While the beneficial
effects of Sullivan cannot be doubted, it has not solved all the related
problems in need of solution. For example, Sullivan places no limit
on the size of the verdict in a defamation case. By removing the trial
from a place of likely prejudice, Connor (and Buckley as well) makes
an excessive verdict improbable. Moreover, Sullivan is concerned
with the status of the plaintiff, not the possibly inflammatory nature
35. Certain publications, especially those whose reputation is built on complete
coverage of the news, may not be easy prey to the temptation to avoid the risk of
controversy. Not all publications, however, have such a powerful incentive or the
economic means to resist such temptation.
ll6. At common law a defamation would not be enjoined unless incident to another
tort. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 755 (1964). This was true even though the plaintiff might
thereby be denied any hope of complete relief. (Injunctions are granted, in general,
only when legal relief is inadequate. Thus, in the situation which would have called
for an injunction because legal relief is inadequate, under the special defamation rule
injunctive relief is denied.)
37. 376 U.S. at 269-83 (1964). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statutes which permit injunctions
against defamatory publications are unconstitutional).
llS. Comment, supra note 21, at 358-59. It could be argued, of course, that any
suit against an out-of-state publisher is capable of having a "chilling effect" on freedom
of the press, but few cases are as amenable as libel cases to a direct appeal to regional
prejudice. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 701, 7ll0-31 (1965) (dissenting
opinion), afj'd 388 U.S. 130 (1967), quoting some remarks made by the plaintiff's
lawyer to the jury:
I say, Gentlemen, this is the time we have got to get them. A hundred million
dollars in advertising, would ten percent of that be fair to ·wallace Butts for what
they have done to him? Would a fifty cent assessment on each of the twenty-three
million issues which they wrote about him there, would that be a strain or a
burden on them? I think it would teach them that we don't have that kind of
journalism down here, and we don't want it down here [Georgia], and we don't
want it to spread from 666 Fifth Avenue any further than that building right now.
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of the alleged libel. Thus, if a newspaper feature should negligently
include the name of a relatively unknown person, not a public official, in its account of a racial disturbance, and if the account should
cast this person in an unfavorable light, the possibility of jury preju•
dice against the newspaper in a subsequent libel case would be just
as strong as in the Sullivan case, but the Sullivan principle would not
apply because the plaintiff was not a public official.
Finally, the Sullivan rule does not protect the out-of-state publisher from the costs of defending himself against frequent worthless
or marginal claims. The Connor case itself was one in which the
plaintiff's evidence was ultimately deemed insufficient,30 but only
after three appearances in the federal district court and three in the
court of appeals. Had the Connor rule been available from the first,
these costs might have been avoided.
There will, of course, be some preliminary inconvenience in
deciding the jurisdictional issues. This problem may be minimized,
however, by the deterrent effect that the Connor rule should have
on a plaintiff who contemplates bringing suit in the wrong forum.
Moreover, an effort can be made to simplify the procedure for resolving the question of jurisdiction. Unless there is a genuine dispute as
to jurisdictional facts, affidavits should be sufficient to settle the
question. 40 If there is such a genuine dispute, the use of a preliminary hearing, hopefully neither long nor complicated, should ordinarily suffice to answer jurisdictional questions before a trial on the
merits becomes necessary. 41 Even if a trial appears to be the only
means adequately to resolve jurisdictional questions, a separate trial
for those questions should be considered.42

III.

THE FUTURE OF THE CONNOR RULE

Both the Second and the Fifth Circuits have recognized the role
of the first amendment in determining the place of trial for a libel
suit between plaintiffs and defendant-publishers from different states.
Connor cast the issue in terms of jurisdiction, Buckley in terms of
forum non conveniens. The Buckley court believed its approach to
have the following advantage:
[It] has the n1erit of focusing attention on the facts allegedly creating
hardship in each case without mandating a uniform rule that would
39. 36!> F.2d at '573-77.
40. This approach was taken in Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 38
F.R.D. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the sole jurisdictional question was also the central
issue to be litigated: whether or not defendant had committed a tort within the state.
41. Id. (suggesting the possibility of a pretrial hearing should the affidavit approach
fail); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
42. FED. R. CIV, P. 42(b) provides that: "The court, in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudic_e ..• may,,order a separate trial . . . of any separate issue or of
any number of •.. issues .•..
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apply whether the place to which the newsp;i.per is summoned to
defend a libel suit is twenty-five or twenty-five hundred miles from
the point of publication, as a jurisdictional due process approach
that necessarily focuses at least in part on state boundaries might
well do. 43
It thus appears that the Buckley court did not perceive the essence
of the Connor rule: the publisher's circulation must "balance the
danger of ... liability," that is, his revenue from circulation within
the state must bear some reasonable relation to what he might lose
from law suits arising out of that circulation. Such a balancing must
necessarily focus attention "on the facts allegedly creating the hardship in each case." The decision of the Golino case by the Fifth
Circuit should serve to dispel any doubts about the flexibility of the
Connor rule, for in Golino the court found the facts to be such that
upholding jurisdiction would "in no way inhibit the zeal with which
Curtis distributes its ideas." 44
Application of the Connor principle to the facts in Buckley should
further illustrate the flexible nature of the jurisdictional approach.
The Buckley court specifically found no danger of regional prejudice
against the defendant, and it further noted that New York City, the
headquarters of the defendant, was only forty miles from the place
in which suit had originally been brought. Thus, under the balancing test of Connor, Connecticut should be permitted to exercise
jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction would put the defendant
to no serious inconvenience, no danger of prejudice, and no extraordinary expense of litigation, and consequently he would have no
incentive to limit either his circulation or his expression.
A hypothetical application of the Buckley rule of forum non
conveniens to the facts of the Connor case is more difficult. Since
Buckley ruled, on the facts of the case, that the place where suit was
brought was the proper place for trial, the rule suggested in Buckley
is still mere dictum that has not yet been tested in action. One of
the difficulties yet to be faced is clarifying the meaning of the "constitutional stature" that Buckley would give to its forum non conveniens rule. 45 It is hoped that "constitutional stature" includes the
right to appellate court review of rulings by the trial court on forum
non conveniens motions. Ordinarily, denial of a motion of forum
non conveniens would not merit such treatment, since the inconvenience that granting the motion is intended to avoid would already
have occurred by the time an appeal could be taken. 46 However, in
43. 373 F.2d at 183.
44. 383 F.2d at 592.
45. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
46. See w. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, I FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 433-40 (C.
Wright ed. 1960). The same reasoning applies to Davis v. Farmers' Co-Operative Equity
Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923), invoked by the Buckley court in favor of its forum non con-
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the context of an interstate libel case review is meaningful for two
reasons: (I) the effects of likely jury prejudice can be cured best by
a reversal with a direction to dismiss,47 the new trial, if there is one,
taking place elsewhere, most likely in the publisher's state; 48 (2) appellate supervision of the application of the first amendment principles is desirable, since consistency, especially with respect to
important constitutional questions, usually depends upon the availability of such supervision. Doctrinal simplicity argues for characterizing the first amendment's role in determining the place of trial as
jurisdictional, since questions of jurisdiction need no exceptional
treatment to be appealable.
The question of characterization is, of course, of little importance
if the essential features are the same. Thus far, the differences benveen the approaches of the Fifth and Second Circuits lie chiefly in
rhetoric; no court has yet demonstrated that one rule must yield
results different from those of the other. It is important that courts
considering long-arm libel cases in the future not create differences
where none yet exist. Connor must not be interpreted as an invitation to a numbers game wherein circulation figures are compared
with a magical minimum. The forum non conveniens of Buckley
must be given its "constitutional stature." Above all, superficial differences between the two cases must not be used to undermine the
principle on which they agree: the first amendment has a proper
role in determining the place of trial in interstate defamation cases.
veniens approach. Davis held that a state court could not exercise jurisdiction over an
interstate carrier when trial in that state would impose an undue burden upon interstate commerce. McGowan, in Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL.
L. REv. 875, 889-90 (1939), made the same point suggested here: that the forum non
conveniens approach was unsatisfactory because, under most circumstances, review
would not be possible until the harm of the inconvenient litigation was almost
complete.
47. See note 33 supra concerning the difficulties of judicial control over prejudice.
If reversal is not accompanied by dismissal-i.e., if a new trial is allowed in the same
location-the effects of prejudice would have no reason to be weaker on the second
round.
48. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966), which held
that a state must have not only minimum contacts with a case, but a sufficient
interest in the case to sustain constitutional jurisdiction, tends to indicate that in
most cases the plaintiff's home state or the defendant's home state will be the only
acceptable forums.

